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A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White 
John Paul Stevens* 
Chief Justice Rehnquist likes to test law clerks' knowledge 
of trivia by asking them to list all of the Supreme Court 
Justices whose names are colors. Although few remember all 
five, the names of Hugo Black and Byron White always come 
readily to  mind.' The links between those two great names 
shed light on Justice White's unique contributions to the 
Supreme Court, and help to  explain his unparalleled knowledge 
of the traditions of the Court. 
The year 1937 was notable for both men. In the fall of 
1937, Hugo Black became the 77th member of the Court. 
Although his appointment was particularly significant because 
it was President Roosevelt7s first, it was probably less 
newsworthy than the exploits of the man who was destined to 
join him on the bench twenty-five years later. For 1937 was the 
season in which one of football's all-time greats made one 
sensational play after another, averaging thirty-one yards on 
his punt returns, punting the ball eighty-four yards without a 
roll, and running and passing for more offensive yardage than 
any other player in the college game. Byron White was not only 
a star on offense, whether carrying the ball, passing it, or 
blocking for a teammate, but also a great defensive player. 
Unlike today's stars, who exhibit flashes of brilliance at 
specialized tasks for a few minutes at a time, he regularly 
played the full sixty minutes of each game. He was just as 
effective in the last minute as in the first. 
The character of White's career as a Justice has been 
remarkably similar. His judicial skills, like his athletic skills, 
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. 
1. The other three Justices are Horace Gray, Henry Billings Brown, and 
Edward Douglass White. Justice White is also one of the twelve Justices (or 
fourteen, if Justices Clarke and Clark are counted) with the same surname as 
another Justice. The others are Rutledge, Marshall, Harlan, Jackson and Lamar. 
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are exceptional and diverse. He is decisive, independent, 
articulate and uncommonly intelligent. He is diligent, thorough 
and cooperative, always discharging his responsibilities 
promptly and carrying more than his share of the Court's 
workload. Moreover, his skills were just as effective when he 
retired in 1993 as when he came to  the Court in 1962. He was 
a regular sixty-minute team player during his entire career. 
Justice White unquestionably has more first-hand 
knowledge about the internal workings of the Supreme Court 
and character of its Justices than any other living person. At 
the time of his retirement, there had been only 106 members of 
the Court. He was the 93rd, and of course worked closely with 
each of the next thirteen appointees as well as with the 
brethren he joined in 1962. Moreover, while serving as a law 
clerk t o  Chief Justice Vinson during the October 1946 Term, he 
wrote memoranda about in forma pauperis petitions that were 
regularly reviewed by a Court whose most senior member, 
Justice Black, was its 77th Justice. He thus had a working 
relationship with well over a quarter of the judges2 who have 
ever served on the C ~ u r t . ~  His relationship with Justice Black, 
which began during Byron's clerkship and was renewed after 
his appointment to the Court, is especially significant, because 
it made Justice White privy to oral traditions that date back to 
Black's appointment in 1937. 
In 1937, shortly after Justice Black received his 
commission, a defendant who had been sentenced to death in 
Connecticut tried to persuade the Court that any action that 
"would be a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments 
I to  VIII) if done by the federal government is now equally 
unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a 
state."4 With only Justice Butler noting a dissent, the Court 
rejected that categorical submission. In his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Cardozo recognized that "the domain of liberty, 
2. Although some of my colleagues prefer the statutory term "Justice," I 
have always thought it fitting to use the title selected by the framers of Article 
111. Moreover, Justice Frankfurter, perhaps the best informed student of the history 
of the Court, described us as "judges." See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 
46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
3. Justices Black, Douglas and Franarter were on the Court when Justice 
White was a law clerk and also when he became a Justice. The only two Justices 
appointed after those three with whom Byron did not serve were Justice Minton 
and Justice Whittaker, whom Byron succeeded. 
4. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US.  319, 323 (1937). 
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withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment 
by the states" had been "enlarged by latter-day judgments to 
include liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action,'" but 
concluded that it did not embrace the double jeopardy claim 
asserted by the defendant, Palko. Although the specific holding 
in that case has been superseded by additional "latter-day 
judgments," reliance on the judicial process to define the 
contours of the domain of liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment has survived. 
That approach has, however, been subjected to  serious 
criticism. Ironically, despite the fact that Justice Black had 
joined the Palko opinion, it was he who became its strongest 
and most effective critic. It was in the 1946 Term of the Court, 
while Byron White was clerking for the Chief Justice, that 
Justice Black wrote his famous dissent in Adamson v. 
Calif~rnia,~ expressly endorsing the thesis that the petitioner 
had advanced in Palko. His analysis of the legislative history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment had convinced him that it was 
specifically intended to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights.' 
At the same time, he rejected any effort by the judiciary to give 
a different or more expansive reading to  the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of "liberty." His disapproval of the 
Court's earlier use of "substantive due process" to invalidate 
progressive legislation had convinced him that judges should 
stay out of the business of trying to  define the concept of 
liberty.' 
The three other opinions in Adamson illustrate different 
approaches t o  defining that concept. For Justice Reed, who 
wrote for the majority, the fact that the Court had already held 
that the Fifth Amendment's protection against giving testimony 
by compulsion did not apply in state trialss was a sufficient 
basis for rejecting Adamson's similar claim.'' One can read 
that opinion as accepting the judge-made common law of the 
5. Id. at 327. 
6. 332 U.S. at 68. 
7. Id. at 71-72, 74-75 (Black, J., dissenting). The appendix to  Justice Black's 
opinion summarizes the relevant history. Id. at  92 (Black, J., dissenting). It 
adequately explains the grant of power to Congress in $ 5 of the Amendment, but 
seems to me to fall short of demonstrating that there was an express intent to 
make the entire Bill of Rights binding on the states without enabling legislation. 
8. See id. at 79-84 (Black, J., dissenting). 
9. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-114 (1908). 
10. See Adurnson, 332 U.S. a t  52-54. 
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eighteenth century, but agreeing with Justice Black's view that 
the concept of liberty as then defined should not be enlarged by 
the judicial process. At the other extreme was Justice Murphy's 
dissent, endorsing Justice Black's conclusion that "the specific 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact 
into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment," but 
disagreeing with his view that those specifics marked the outer 
limit of the Amendment's protection. l1 
Justice Franfirter expressed an intermediate position in 
his concurring opinion. Relying heavily on the views of the 
"forty-three judges" who sat on the Court during the seventy 
years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, he 
firmly rejected Justice Black's position and adhered to  the view 
that the Amendment "inescapably imposes upon this Court an 
exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings 
in order to  ascertain whether they offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of 
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the 
most heinous  offense^."^^ His conclusion in the particular case 
was adverse to the defendant, but his approach, unlike Justice 
Black's, recognized the importance of providing protection 
against abuses other "than those which had become manifest in 
1791."13 
When Justice White joined the Court in 1962, this debate 
about the method of defining the domain of liberty protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment was still very much alive-as, 
indeed, it is today. Justice White quickly made his own mark 
on the proceedings. His contributions to the debate have been 
much too significant to be evaluated fully in a single article. 
Nevertheless, two observations may be appropriate before 
turning to certain other aspects of his work. 
A wealth of cases attest to Justice White's refusal t o  
imprison the concept of liberty in eighteenth century legal 
11. Id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
12. Id. at 62, 67-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
13. Id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
As judges charged with the delicate task of subjecting the government of 
a continent to the Rule of Law wc must be particularly mindful that it is 
"a constitution we are expounding," so that it should not be imprisoned in 
what are merely legal forms even t.hough they have the sanction of the 
Eighteenth Century. 
Id. at 66 (Franldurter, J., concurring). 
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forms. His opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,14 for instance, 
squarely and correctly rested its conclusion that the statutory 
prohibition against  t h e  use  of contraceptives was  
unconstitutional on the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.15 Like Justice Harlan in G r i s ~ o l d , ' ~  and  
Justice Frankfurter in Adanson, Justice White expressly 
rejected Justice Black's view that the substantive content of the 
Liberty Clause is limited to the guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights. l7 
In other contexts, as well, Justice White was among the 
first to identify and condemn arbitrary official conduct. In  
a reas  a s  diverse a s  prison administration,'' school 
discipline,lg public e m p l ~ ~ r n e n t ~ ~  and the regulation of 
14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
15. "In my view this Co~ec t i cu t  law as applied to married couples deprives 
them of 'liberty' without due process of law, as that concept is used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring in judgment). His 
opinion rested primarily on Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
Despite the fact that the prohibition against the use of contraceptives in the 
papal encyclical Humanae Vitae is still supported by highly respected authority, 
none of the opinions in Griswold mentions the encyclical as the probable 
explanation for what Justice Stewart characterized as "an uncommonly silly law." 
381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
16. Griswold, 381 U.S. at  499 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). 
17. Justice White explained in a footnote that 
[dlissenting opinions assert that the liberty guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause is limited to a guarantee against unduly vague statutes 
and against procedural unfairness a t  trial. Under this view the Court is 
without authority to ascertain whether a challenged statute, or its 
application, has a permissible purpose and whether the manner of 
regulation bears a rational or justifying relationship to this purpose. A 
long line of cases makes very clear that this has not been the view of 
this Court. 
Id. at 504, n.* (White, J., concurring in judgment). 
18. Writing for the Court in Wolff v. McDo~e l l ,  418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974), 
Justice White stated, 
But though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of 
the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of 
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no 
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this 
country. . . . We also reject the assertion of the State that whatever may 
be true of the Due Process Clause in general or of other rights protected 
by that Clause against state infringement; the interest of prisoners in 
disciplinary procedures is not included in that "liberty" protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
19. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) ("The Due Process Clause also 
forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. Where a person's good name, reputation, 
honor, or integrity is at  stake because of what the government is doing to him,' 
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automobile safety:' Justice White insisted on fair and 
rational treatment by the government." His opinion for the 
Court in Stanley u. Illinoisz3 afforded constitutional protection 
to an unmarried father's interest in his child. More recently, 
his dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.'* rejected 
the traditional, narrow approach to the rights of an unmarried 
father.25 
At the same time, however, Justice White's opinions, like 
those of Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Cardozo, 
demonstrate a conviction that the judicial power to define the 
concept of liberty is not open-ended. His evaluation of the state 
interests supporting abortion  regulation^:^ the prohibition of 
sodomy,2' and the bizarre zoning regulation invalidated in 
Moore u. City of East C l e ~ e l a n d : ~  persuaded him that those 
deprivations of liberty were constitutional. Regardless of 
whether "latter-day judgments" ultimately confirm or reject his 
particular conclusions in those cases, his method of analysis 
remained faithful to the approach that other great judges have 
the minimal requirements of the Clause must be satisfied." (citing Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 430 U.S. 433, 437 (1971))); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 692-700 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
20. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, he has 
consistently voted to protect public employees from discrimination on account of 
their political affiliation. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. 
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
21. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
22. Although I shall not otherwise comment on Justice White's important 
opinions construing the First Amendment, I note that he agreed with Justice 
Black's conclusion in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (White, J., concurring), while rejecting his purely 
textual analysis of the Amendment. 
23. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
24. 491 U.S. 110, 157 (1989). 
25. There is an interesting parallel between the several opinions in that case 
and those in Adamson. Footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by the Chief 
Justice, id. at 127, takes the same approach as Justice Reed's Court opinion, while 
the separate opinion of Justice O 'Co~or ,  joined by Justice Kennedy, id. at  ,132 
(O'Comor, J., concurring in part), is like Justice Frankfurter's in that it refuses to 
foreclose unanticipated future developments in the law. The dissenters' views are, 
of course, closest to those expressed by Justice Murphy in Adamson. Id. at 136 
( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting). 
26. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
US.  747, 785, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
27. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
28. 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
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followed in the continuing effort to understand the concept of 
liberty. 
A similar acceptance of judicial responsibility tempered by 
a healthy respect for other branches of government is reflected 
in Justice White's opinions construing the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. 
His explanation in Coker v. Georgiaz9 of why a death sentence 
is grossly disproportionate and excessive for the crime of raping 
an adult woman first carefully reviewed relevant state 
statutesS0 and the sentencing decisions of juries in comparable 
cases:' but ultimately concluded that "the Constitution 
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought 
to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty 
under the Eighth A~nendment."~~ While he has joined opinions 
according the states broad latitude in administering capital 
puni~hment ,~~ Justice White also cast one of the five votes in 
Furman v. Georgia34 t o  invalidate the then-prevalent, 
open-ended statutory procedures for administering the death 
penalty:5 and his Court opinion in Enmund u. FloridaS6 
established that such punishment must be tailored to the 
defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt." Perhaps 
most significantly, his recent dissenting opinion in Harmelin u. 
Michigan3' contains an effective refutation of two Justices' 
29. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
30. Id. at 593-96. 
31. Id. at 596-97. 
32. Id. at 597. 
33. See Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 
137 (1987). 
34. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972). 
35. His reasoning may provide important guidance in some future review of 
this still-troublesome issue. After noting that the death penalty had "not been 
considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense because it 
was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve," he continued: 
Id. 
At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these purposes, 
however, the emerging question is whether its imposition in such 
circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it 
would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless 
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social 
or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State 
would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative 
of the Eighth Amendment. 
at 312. 
36. 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
37. 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2709 (1991). 
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remarkable argument that proportionality should play no part 
in the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis. 
Justice White's Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence does not, of course, begin to exhaust his 
contribution t o  the Court's case law. The depth and diversity of 
Justice White's understanding of the work of the Supreme 
Court is difficult to  describe. He paid particular attention to  
the cases on the Court's original docket that seldom receive 
public notice. His expertise in jurisdictional matters, water 
rights, communications law, voting rights and a variety of other 
issues was exceptional. In his construction of statutes, he 
carefully reviewed and evaluated the relevant legislative 
history.3g Indeed, he was prepared to defend the use of 
legislative history against those who questioned its value, 
explaining that "common sense suggests that inquiry benefits 
from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring 
it.2239 
While Justice White's contributions t o  the Court are fairly 
reflected in his extensive written opinions, other aspects of his 
work are less well known. He brought a concentrated attention, 
and a special style, to our day-to-day labors, both of which will 
be sorely missed. 
One of the most striking features of Justice White's 
approach to the Court's daily operations was his unique focus 
on the discretionary certiorari docket. I believe that Justice 
White treated the Court's participation in the legislative 
history of the Judges' Bill-the 1925 statute giving the Court 
discretionary jurisdiction over most of its docket4%s a 
commitment to Congress that if the Bill were enacted, the 
Court would give careful, individualized scrutiny t o  every 
certiorari petition that might thereafter be filed? His own 
38. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 
(1978) (opinion of White, J.). 
39. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2485 n.4 (1991). 
Justice White went on to note: 
Legislative history materials are not generally so misleading that jurists 
should never employ them in a good faith effort to discern legislative 
intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the Court's practice of utilizing 
legislative history reaches well into its past. We suspect that the practice 
will likewise reach well into the future. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
40. The Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936. 
41. I have described relevant portions of that legislative history in my article 
about the Rule of Four. See John Paul Stevens, The Lifespan of a Judge-Made 
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thorough review of those petitions each week was certainly 
consistent with the conscientious fulfillment of such an 
obligation. Justice White regularly identified more petitions for 
discussion at  conference than any other Associate Justice, and 
his frequent published dissents from orders denying certiorari 
demonstrate the depth of his concern about the discharge of 
our responsibility. 
Those published dissents, however, tell only part of the 
story. What they do not reveal is the significant number of 
occasions on which a draft dissent from denial of certiorari 
remained unpublished, because it actually persuaded one or 
more of Justice White's colleagues to change a vote from a 
"deny" to a "grant." Often, then, it was Justice White's 
unpublished eloquence that was responsible for a grant of 
certiorari, and with it, the reversal of an unjust conviction or 
an incorrect interpretation of a federal statute. While I have 
adhered to a contrary practice, and refrained from circulating 
dissents from denial of certiorari:' I must acknowledge that 
Justice White's successes in this area are a strong argument 
for the value of such dissents. 
Justice White enjoyed oral arguments. As was apparent to 
everyone present, he had a complete mastery of the controlling 
issues of argued cases. When a petitioner's oral presentation 
relied on a theory that differed from the written brief, Justice 
White could be expected to identify that difference in his 
questioning of counsel. Similarly, when a respondent put forth 
a new reason for affirming, the Justice typically would ask 
whether counsel was prepared to defend the rationale adopted 
by the court below. His questions were usually terse-an 
apparent gruffness often masking a subtle wit-but they 
inevitably revealed his perceptive and thorough preparation. 
In the 1946 Term, when Byron was a law clerk, draft 
opinions were mechanically produced in the Court's own print 
shop. When a draft was completed, the author would distribute 
one copy to each Justice. Sometimes the receiving Justice 
would ask his law clerk (each Associate Justice had just one 
clerk) for comments on the draft; more frequently, if he was 
satisfied with it, the Justice would simply return the draft t o  
Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1983). 
42. See Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 942 (1978) (opinion of 
Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
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its author with the hand-written message, "Please join me," 
noted on the draft itself. 
The print shop has been replaced by the computer, and 
single copies and single law clerks have been replaced by 
multiple copies and multiple law clerks. Prompt and direct 
responses from joining Justices to authors are now less 
frequent. Suggestions for improvements, with copies to the 
entire Court, as well as a reluctance to join until others have 
responded, have sometimes produced delays much longer than 
any occasioned by the now-obsolete printing presses. Even the 
"please join me" formula seems anachronistic, appearing as it 
now does in a separate letter omitting the object of the 
sentence. 
Nevertheless, Justice White, like other of the most senior 
members of the Court, has maintained some of the traditions of 
the past. He generally responded to opinion drafts quickly and 
straightforwardly, joining without reservation when he was in 
general agreement with the authoring Justice. And while 
younger Justices now tend to reply to drafts with more 
grammatically correct comments such as "I would be pleased to 
join your opinion," Justice White still used the traditional 
"please join me" when he endorsed the dissent he asked me to 
write in the Court's most recent misadventure in the land of 
antitrust.43 
Traditionally, the release of a Court opinion is preceded by 
a n  oral announcement by its author. Chief Justice Burger, who 
was responsible for many changes that made the Court a 
happier and more efficient work-place-ranging from Xerox 
copiers and word processors to hall carpeting and a bench 
reshaped to enable the two most junior Justices to see and hear 
each other during oral argukents-considered those oral 
statements a waste of valuable time. Accordingly, he would 
merely announce the number or name of the case and the fact 
that  the judgment had been affirmed or reversed. Justice 
White, unlike most other members of the Court, shared the 
Chiefs views and followed his practice for several yews. At the 
43. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 
2578 (1993) (affirming setting aside of jury verdict for plaintiff in antitrust case); 
id. at 2598 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White and I privately shared the 
opinion that Brooke Group was a case that would not only have been decided 
differently by the Court he joined in 1962, but most likely would have been 
unanimous as well. A jury verdict commanded more respect from the Court then 
than it does today. 
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very end of his career, however, he made an unforgettable 
impression on the rest of us by returning to his original 
practice and announcing his opinions from the bench. While 
most oral announcements consist of reading from a prepared 
text with the arid flavor of a syllabus, Byron spoke 
extemporaneously with the clarity, simplicity, and charm that 
characterizes the most effective advocate. 
While I was already well acquainted with Justice White's 
charm, having first met him during World War I1 when we 
both served in the Navy, it was during my first Term on the 
Court that Byron taught me how persuasive he can be. I was 
assigned the task of preparing the majority opinion in Buffalo 
Forge Co. v. United  steelworker^:^ a case presenting the 
question whether a federal court could enjoin a sympathy 
strike pending an arbitrator's decision as to whether it violated 
the no-strike clause in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. After I prepared what I thought was an 
unanswerable draft, Byron wrote a dissent that was not only 
an adequate answer, but also sufficiently persuasive to change 
the outcome of the case. Nor was that the only time that I 
authored a proposed majority opinion that eventually became a 
dissent from an opinion of the Court announced by Justice 
White. Indeed, his practice of writing dissents that turned into 
majorities persisted into his last Terms as an active Justice. 
Byron was equally effective in the conferences that I 
attended. As a relatively senior Justice, he was one of the first 
to speak, and usually did so without any notes, always stating 
the issues fairly and accurately. Typically, his position in the 
case was both firm and unambiguous. On rare occasions, 
however, he expressed a willingness to  join a majority for 
either result, believing that a clear ruling on the legal issue 
was more important than the outcome in the particular case. 
More rarely still, he stated his intent to  reexamine the case in 
the light of what might be written by those firmly committed to 
one position or another. Even without such an expression at 
conference, Justice White always was willing to listen, and 
never hesitated to acknowledge that further study had changed 
his mind. Obviously, that was not a frequent occurrence, but 
his candor on those rare occasions was both memorable and 
admirable. 
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Our work involves a great deal of correspondence, usually 
hand-delivered with copies for each member of the Court. Some 
of those letters are detailed discussions of debatable points in a 
circulating draft opinion; some are nothing more than routine 
votes on noncontroversial issues. Occasionally, they concern 
personal matters, such as a plan to recognize a forthcoming 
birthday with an appropriate toast. In Byron's case, such an 
occasion was doubly significant, because it also gave us an 
opportunity to express our affection for his wife, Marion, whose 
birthday is the same as his. 
The internal letters that Byron circulated would often 
conclude with the one word, "Cheers." While that word always 
conveyed a warm and friendly message, it occurs to  me that it 
also accurately describes my appraisal of Byron's entire 
magnificent career. Despite our differences on a variety of 
issues of varying importance, when he first told me of his 
intent to retire, my immediate, spontaneous, and heartfelt 
response was to  urge him not to  do so. The decision having 
been made, however, I have only this to  say: "Cheers." 
Warren E. Burger* 
I was a colleague of Byron White for seventeen years on 
the Supreme Court, and during that period we agreed far more 
than we disagreed. Since Justice White's retirement, various 
persons have been at great pains to classify him as either 
"conservative" or "liberal." I have never been quite sure what 
the writers or speakers mean in the use of each of those terms. 
Reflecting on my seventeen years of almost daily association 
with Byron White, however, I look back on some of his opinions 
and dissents that would lead me to  reject the idea that he is a 
"conservative," notwithstanding his well-established positions 
on abortion and other high-profde issues that catch the public's 
eye, but are not representative of the Court's work, or that he 
is a 'liberal." The term "legal realist" comes more near to 
describing him than any of the others. 
Byron White's dissent in Mirandu u. Arizona1 is revealing. 
The decision in that case was not altogether revolutionary. For 
my part, I had always admired the British system of justice 
* Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1969-1986; Chairman 
of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the Constitution, 1985-1992. 
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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and thought their judicial system and professional legal system 
were the best in the world. On numerous occasions, 
particularly in lectures at law schools, I had advocated that we 
adopt the British system of having the arresting police officer 
give a warning to the person arrested, which is similar to, but 
not precisely, the Miranda warning. I thought that this was 
only fair and that it would save a lot of trouble in the long run. 
But Miranda went beyond the British rule: so I tended to 
agree with Justice White's dissent in that case. In a dozen 
years on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, I had frequently written dissenting opinions expressing 
thoughts similar to those of Justice White in his Miranda 
dissent .3 
What is especially significant about Justice White's dissent 
in Miranda, for what it says about his approach to the law in 
general, is his criticism of the majority's methodology. There, 
he wrote: "Decisions like these cannot rest alone on syllogism, 
metaphysics or some ill-defined notions of natural justice . . . . 
[This] Court should not proceed to formulate fundamental 
policies based on speculation a10ne.'~ He had made the same 
point before. In an earlier dissent he criticized the Court for 
imposing its own philosophical predilections upon State 
legislatures or Congress. I fail to see why the Court deems it 
more appropriate to write into the Constitution its own 
abstract notions of how best to handle the narcotics problem, 
for it obviously cannot match either the States or Congress in 
expert ~nderstanding.~ 
It is probably these of White's views that confound the 
academic writers searching for convenient labels. Justice White 
was cognizant of his role as an Article I11 judge on the Court t o  
decide "cases" and "controversies," not t o  expound grand 
theories of law as a law professor might; it is useful for 
academics to  explore new theories, and that task is best left to  
them. 
2. For a comparison of Miranda and the British system, see Judith Hails 
Kaci, Confessions: A Comparison of Exclusion Under Miranda in the United States 
and Under the Judges' Rule in England, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 87 (1982). 
3. See, e.g., Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1171-72, 1176 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969) (en banc) (Burger, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531-32 (White, J., dissenting). 
5. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting). 
6. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $ 2. 
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I found that Justice White and I were in general 
agreement on First Amendment issues. He never overlooked, as 
some members of the Court did, the difference between conduct 
and speech. This, of course, explains his dissenting vote in the 
flag-burning case.? We also generally agreed on separation of 
powers issues, although Bowsher v. Synars and Immigration & 
Naturalization Service v. Chadhas are notable exceptions. The 
case that stands out in this regard is Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill,'' the separation of powers overtones of 
which are often overlooked. There the Court, joined by Justice 
White, reiterated the bedrock principle of judicial restraint 
essential to a viable separation of powers: 
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a 
particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be 
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the 
meaning of an enactment i s  discerned and i t s  
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an 
end. . . . 
. . . [Iln our constitutional system the commitment to 
separation of powers is too fbndamental for us to pre-empt 
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 
"common sense and the public weal." Our Constitution vests 
such responsibilities in the political branches." 
Although in applying separation of powers concepts Justice 
White sometimes took, in my view, a more "pragmatic" 
approach than the Constitution allows, Justice White shared 
the view, expressed in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, that 
policy choices were appropriately left to the political branches 
of government. In Bowsher, he wrote: "Like the Court, I will 
not purport to speak to the wisdom of the policies incorporated 
in the legislation the Court invalidates; that is a matter for the 
Congress and the Executive . . . ."I2 That view, which Justice 
White stated with some frequency, might to some reflect a lack 
of "vision." To me, however, it reflects faithfulness to the vision 
of our Constitution. Justice White's contributions to the Court 
in his thirty-one years of service will be well- and long- 
7. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
8. 478 U.S. 714 (1986); cf. id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting). 
9. 462 U.S. 919 (1983); cf. id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting). 
10. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
11. Id. at 194-95. 
12. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting). 
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remembered, and his steadfastness as a "realist" will be 
missed. 
William J. Brennan, Jr.' 
I am delighted to have the opportunity to add my voice t o  
the chorus of tribute that has been lavished upon my dear 
friend and colleague Byron White since his retirement from the 
Court. While Byron and I disagreed often about the issues, we 
remained the closest of friends throughout the more than 
twenty-eight years we sat together. I remember fondly my 
lunches with Byron at neighborhood restaurants, and the 
evenings of dinner and conversation we spent at each other's 
homes. I still reminisce about the wonderful party that Marion 
and Byron hosted for Mary and me at the Court when I retired. 
I view Byron's unfailing friendship over the years, especially in 
the face of our not infrequent differences of opinion, as a 
testimony to  the Court as an institution and to  Byron White as 
an individual. 
It is not simply that our disagreements remained cordial 
and that we never took them personally. Much more than that, 
the give and take was an indispensable part of the process and, 
to my mind, always productive. All of us on the Court 
benefitted from Byron's meticulous preparation and his clear, 
direct presentation of the issues at conference. His positions 
were always very well stated; you couldn't ignore them, and I 
think the need to  respond to his points improved my own 
opinions. 
This is not to say that Byron and I never found ourselves 
on common ground.- We of& did. One need look back no 
further than the last day of our final Term together to find an 
important example: Byron joined my opinion for the Court in 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,' which rejected an equal 
protection challenge to the Federal Communications 
Commission's minority preference policies. Byron and I also 
saw eye to eye in Garcia v. Sun Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority: in which the Court held that Congress, consistent 
with its power under the Commerce Clause, could extend to  
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 1956-1990. 
1. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
2. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
US. 833 (1976). 
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San Antonio municipal transit employees the protection of the 
wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
Garcia is remembered for rejecting the "traditional 
governmental functions" approach to state regulatory immunity 
that had been adopted nine years earlier in National League of 
Cities v. Usery? Of course, National League of Cities had itself 
overruled the Court's decision still eight years earlier in 
Maryland v. WirtzO4 I remember a former clerk of his 
remarking that Byron's return from the conference in which 
the Court decided to hear National League of Cities, 
presumably with a view to overrule Wirtz, was one of the very 
rare occasions on which the Justice became visibly disturbed 
with his colleagues. 
The list of cases in which Byron and I found ourselves in 
agreement amongst a divided Court could of course continue; 
other noteworthy examples include NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 
Scientific, Inc.: Frontier0 v. Richardson: and Palmer v. 
Thornps~n.~ But the fact remains that we disagreed often, and 
not infrequently in the most important and controversial areas. 
There are perhaps few more conspicuous examples than 
abortion decisions such as Roe v. Wade8 and Thornburgh u. 
American College of Obstetricians and  gynecologist^.^ Two 
other divisive cases that come quickly to  mind are the Court's 
5-4 decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick,'' the Georgia sodomy 
statute case, and Texas v. Johnson," the flag-burning 
decision. Still other important cases where Byron and I held 
opposing views are Sherbert u. Verner,12 in which I authored 
3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
Justice White (and Justice Marshall) joined my dissent in National League of 
Cities. See 426 US. a t  856. 
4. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
5. 494 U.S. 775 (1990) (holding that the NLRB acted within its discretion in 
refusing to adopt a presumption that striker replacement workers oppose the 
certified collective-bargaining agent). 
6. 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973) (plurality opinion) (establishing gender as a 
suspect classification for purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment). 
7. 403 U.S. 217, 240 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that the city 
council's closing of public pools in Jackson, Mississippi to avoid a desegregation 
order was a denial of equal protection). 
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
9. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
11. 491 US. 397 (1989). 
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny and invalidating the 
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the opinion for the Court and Justice White joined the dissent; 
Branzburg v. Hayes,13 where our roles were reversed; and 
Washington v. Dauis,14 in which Justice White and I wrote 
respectively for the Court and in dissent. I also took issue with 
Byron's opinion for the Court in Gaffiey v. Curnming~,'~ 
which he once described as his favorite case? On these and 
so many other occasions, Byron and I were able to "agree to 
disagree," maintaining a close and constant friendship through 
nearly three decades together on the Court. 
For nearly two of those three decades, Byron and I sat next 
to each other on the bench, which put me in a particularly 
opportune spot to enjoy his sharp wit. Many was the time that 
he enlivened a dull session of oral argument with a quip about 
an awkward attorney or a tedious case. Byron was often 
discrete enough t o  pass me a note, but sometimes he simply 
leaned over and spoke to me in what he liked to think was a 
whisper. Byron never did learn how to  whisper. I also 
remember that Byron would address me from time to time as 
"Billy," which I must say was an unusual but quite agreeable 
moniker. (My good friend Justice Harlan was not so felicitous 
when I occasionally slipped and greeted him as "Johnny," 
which would always cause the color to drain from his face.) I 
also owe a special debt of gratitude to  Byron for being generous 
enough to allow me to purloin one of his secretaries, Mary 
Elmore, who has been with me now for almost eleven years. 
In the end, no survey of opinions, no collection of 
anecdotes, no words of tribute, can Nly capture Justice White's 
weighty contribution to the Court and to  the country. Byron 
served with the utmost integrity and distinction during a 
tenure longer than that of all but eight Justices in the history 
of the Court. The words President Kennedy spoke upon 
government's denial of unemployment benefits based on the applicant's observance 
of Saturday Sabbath). 
13. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not prevent 
a grand jury from compelling news reporters to reveal confidential fads and 
sources). 
14. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of intentional discrimination, 
notwithstanding a showing of disparate impact, in order for black applicants to the 
District of Columbia police department to  sustain a claim under the equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
15. 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (allowing greater deviations from population equality 
for state legislative districts than for congressional districts). 
16. David Lauter, The Justices List Their Most Menorable Cases, NAT'L L.J., 
Nov. 25, 1985, at  5. 
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nominating Justice White to the Court in 1962 are no less true 
today-this rugged individualist from Colorado truly has 
"excelled in everything he has attempted."" I trust 
"retirement" will give Byron an opportunity to enjoy the same 
portion in some new and exciting endeavors, and I wish him 
and Marion every happiness. 
Harry A. Blackmun* 
Because Justice White is the senior among us, he has been 
a member of the Court every day that any of the rest of us has 
served here. His wisdom and gentle prodding have been of 
great assistance. One may not always agree with his con- 
clusions, but those conclusions have been firmly and steadfastly 
and confidently held. That, indeed, is the way the system 
works and was intended to  work. 
We are the better because of his presence among us all 
these years. That presence will be sorely missed. 
17. Statement by the President upon Appointing Byron White to the Supreme 
Court, PUB. PAPERS 283, 283 (Mar. 30, 1962). 
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 1970-1994. 
